The ever increasing technology of the information age has led to unprecedented access to information, increases in capabilities and the evolution of cyberspace. However, the great advances come with a danger. Information stored on both government and private networks, the networks themselves and the operating systems of infrastructures essential to the security and well being of the United States are exposed to cyber access, disruption and attack operations. The purpose of this paper is to identify how the United States should respond to the threat of cyber operations against essential government and private networks. The paper first examines the applicability of established international law to cyber operations. It next proposes a method for categorizing cyber operations across a spectrum synchronized with established international law. The paper finally discusses actions already taken by the United States to protect critical government and private networks and concludes with additional steps the United States should take to respond to the threat of cyber operations.
Responding to Cyber Attacks and the Applicability of Existing International Law
The ever increasing technology of the information age has led to many advances in information technology, allowing unprecedented access to information and the automation of many previously manual functions. Formerly stand alone systems are now connected by government and private networks into systems of systems accessible from the Internet. The technology has led to increases in capabilities and efficiencies and the evolution of cyberspace. Cyberspace is defined as the physical infrastructure, user devices and network equipment, the information contained in it, and the software required to operate it. However, these great advances come with a danger to the security and well being of the United States. Information stored on both government and private networks, the networks themselves and the operating systems of government and private infrastructures essential to the security and well being of the United States are exposed to cyber operations. Cyber operations are those malicious actions taken in cyberspace intended access, disrupt or attack the information, the enabling physical infrastructures or to cause effects in the physical world. Examples of key infrastructure include: local, state and federal government management systems; financial and banking systems; petroleum production and distribution systems; electrical production and distribution systems; telecommunications systems; and the production and distribution of other essential goods and services to include food. Cyber operations against key infrastructures have the potential to cause physical effects outside the virtual world. Examples include: interfering with a government's ability to communicate with its population; disrupting the flow of goods and services essential to the economy and the physical destruction of infrastructures such as nuclear power plants; power 2 grids; or petroleum pipelines. Cyber operations directed against key infrastructures have the potential to impose catastrophic impact on the United States. The purpose of this paper is to identify how the United States should respond to the threat of cyber operations against government and private networks essential to the security and well being of the nation. The paper will examine the applicability of established international law to the cyber domain in order to identify what can be done within the framework of existing law. The discussion of existing internal law will focus on jus en bellum, the law governing the use of force, and jus in bello, the law governing the conduct of armed conflict. The paper continues with a proposed method for categorizing cyber operations across a spectrum tied to their legality under existing international law. Next the paper discusses the United States' response to date across the elements of national power, The Tallinn Manual details a number of key concepts relevant to responding to cyber operations. The first concept is "sovereignty." No state has "sovereignty" over cyberspace, but it has sovereign control over cyber infrastructure physically located within its geographic territory. Significantly, the state may regulate cyber infrastructure 4 within its borders. Additionally, the territorial "sovereignty" of the state protects cyber infrastructure residing within it. 5 States are also responsible for knowingly allowing cyber infrastructure within its territory to be used to negatively or illegally affect another state.
Victims of cyber operations originating from the territory of another state may be legally entitled to respond proportionately, to include the use of force, in self defense. However, absent aggression rising to the level of "armed attack," "proportionality" limits a state's response to only that of compelling the aggressor to return to compliance with international law 6 An additional concept of international law is state "responsibility."
States are responsible for acts and omissions attributed to entities of the state not just in the traditional physical domains, but also in the cyber domain. States are also responsible for acts and omissions committed by proxies if the proxies are acting at the direction of the state. 7 Of important note, definitive "attribution" of cyber operations is challenging. However, if cyber operations can be attributed to states or proxies then the principle of "responsibility" applies. defense with its own "use of force." As with the "use of force," the threshold for an "armed attack" is not specifically defined. Determination as to whether a "use of force" rises to the level of "armed attack" is largely determined by its scale and effects. Cyber operations injuring or killing people or damaging and destroying property certainly have sufficient scale and effect to constitute an "armed attack." A cyber operation targeting a nation's critical infrastructures with effects resulting in injury, death, damage or destruction is an "armed attack." The larger the scale and the impact of the effects the greater the likelihood it is for a "use of force" to rise to the level of an "armed attack." How a state responds to a "use of force" equating to an "armed attack," including attacks committed in cyberspace, is constrained by the jus ad bellum concepts of "necessity" and "proportionality." First, a state may respond with the "use of force" only out of "necessity" to defeat the attack or imminent threat of attack. If measures not rising to the level of the "use of force" are sufficient to defeat the attack, then the "use of force" in self defense is not permissible. Secondly, for the response to an attack to be acceptable it must show "proportionality." In the context of jus ad bellum this means only the amount of force necessary to repel an attack is permissible. Additionally, international law governing the "use of force" does not require the act of defense to be in the same domain as the attack. A kinetic attack in self defense, that is both necessary and proportionate, may be made in response to a cyber attack. 10 Cyber operations are commonly divided into two broad categories, exploitation and attack. Cyber exploitation generally is considered the less severe cyber threat and consists of activities such as the theft of information and denial of service attacks. Cyber attacks are considered more severe and are generally characterized by the destruction 7 of information or by actions in the virtual world causing destruction in the real world. The two category definitions are also based on the perceived intent of the individual, organization or nation state conducting the cyber activity. Intent is not always simple to identify when the identity of the malicious actor may be unknown. These two broad categories also do not take into account the most important aspect of a malicious cyber event, the effects the attack achieves.
According to Colonel Gary Brown and Lieutenant Colonel Owen Tullos, United
States Cyber Command, a different and more effective way to define cyber operations is to consider them along a horizontal spectrum, based on the effects they achieve. Cyber disruption operations may or may not equal a "use of force" and do not rise to the level of "armed attack." On the right end of the spectrum are cyber attack operations.
Attack operations are actions in cyber space equaling a "use of force" and an "armed attack." 11 Defining cyber attacks along a spectrum also conforms to the Tallinn Manual's evaluation criteria of severity, measurability and legality for defining the "use of force."
Cyber operations to the left of the spectrum are less severe, less measurable, less likely 8 to be illegal or equal a "use of force." Cyber operations to the right of the spectrum are more severe, more measurable, more likely to be illegal or equal a "use of force." The best know example of a cyber attack operation is the 2010 Stuxnet attack.
The Stuxnet attack operation meticulously targeted the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA systems of one thousand centrifuges being used by Iran to enrich uranium. The attack operation caused the centrifuges to be destroyed. 18 The
Stuxnet cyber attack operation resulted in physical destruction and could therefore be  Coordinate and redirect research and development (R&D) efforts.
 Connect current cyber ops centers to enhance situational awareness.
 Develop and implement a government-wide cyber counterintelligence (CI) plan.
 Increase the security of our classified networks.
 Expand cyber education.
 Define and develop enduring "leap-ahead" technology, strategies, and programs.
 Define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs.
 Develop a multi-pronged approach for global supply chain risk management.
 Define the Federal role for extending cybersecurity into critical infrastructure domains.  Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cyber security strategy.
 Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cyber security.
 Leverage the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation. States policy for cyberspace. The first policy is that established international law applies to cyberspace. The second policy is hostile activities in cyberspace cannot be conducted without rules or restraint. Specifically jus in bello, also known as the law of armed conflict, applies to cyberspace. United States policy with regard to the law of armed conflict is that cyberspace is a technological evolution, and the existing rules apply to the new innovation. The third policy is cyber operations resulting in death, injury or significant destruction would likely be considered a "use of force" rising to the level of an "armed attack." Three examples of cyber operations likely to be considered a "use of force" include attacks resulting in the meltdown of a nuclear reactor, opening a dam and causing physical destruction and disrupting an air traffic control system causing aircraft to crash. Cyber operations producing the same physical destruction as caused by a kinetic weapon would be considered a "use of force." The fourth policy statement is
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allowing states' the right to self defense applies 14 to cyberspace if a cyber operation equates to the "use of force" or the imminent threat of the "use of force." The fifth, sixth and seventh policies are the jus in bello principles of "necessity," "distinction" and "proportionality" all apply to cyber operations. Cyber operations must be necessary to accomplish the mission, must target valid military targets and not cause greater collateral damage compared to the military gain. The eighth policy is that states should analyze cyber weapons to determine if they are inherently indiscriminate and violate the principles of "distinction" and "proportionality."
The ninth policy is national "sovereignty" must be considered for cyber operations to be lawful. The physical infrastructure enabling cyberspace to exist in the real world resides in nearly all countries. Consideration must be given to the second order effects on other nations caused by a cyber operation. The tenth and final policy is states are culpable for cyber operations conducted by agents acting on their behalf. USCYBERCOM's mission is:
USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US / Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries. The fourth priority is creating a cyber common operation picture fusing relevant information from government, DoD, law enforcement, industry, critical infrastructure providers, and friends and allies to enable decision making in the cyber domain. The final priority is the authority to act in defense of the nation. The priority's emphasis is on integrating DoD, DHS and Department of Justice, or DOJ, functions to defend the nation in cyberspace. 26 In the realm of Diplomatic, Informational and Law Enforcement elements of power the United States DOJ announced plans in 2012 to indict state sponsored cyber 17 attackers. The plan calls for special training for more than one hundred prosecutors to assist DHS and DoD agencies to identify cases that can be brought to trial. Cases could be brought against both private citizens and officials in a government. Potentially, the most advantageous entity for the United States to indict would be a foreign corporation who used and profited from the theft of intellectual property. 27 The companies convicted could be fined, enforcing a monetary penalty. In addition, or if imposing a fine is unpractical, sanctions could be imposed targeting the company, its executives and its products. cyberspace. The United States should treat our international cyber adversaries, both state and non-state, as we do terrorists. The United States should update federal cyber security policy and guidance utilizing existing authorities. Finally, legislation is required to address deficiencies that cannot be remediated with existing authorities. Specifically, legislation is required to: Clarify reporting requirements for cyber events; codify the authorities and responsibilities of organizations charged with defending against cyber attacks; establish a mechanism for private companies to share information on cyber attacks; and to establish minimum cyber standards to protect critical infrastructure.
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The United States has long maintained a policy to provide the nation guaranteed access to the global commons in order to ensure our economic prosperity and national security. Just as UNCLOS is providing a framework for nations to interact in the global commons of air and maritime, a similar international framework should be also be The newest of the domains, cyberspace, is essential to the continued prosperity, security and well being of the United States. Although the existing international concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello can and should apply to cyberspace, a shared international framework similar in concept to UNCLOS is needed to provide specificity 23 and predictability for interactions in cyberspace. Cyber aggressors should also be held to the full weight of justice available. Domestically, the United States should update regulations and legislation to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the protection of essential government and private networks.
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